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These practices—varying the number and tim-
ing of employees’ work hours, providing little 
advance notice of work hours, and offering em-
ployees limited input into their work sched-
ule—can undermine job quality by structuring 
instability and unpredictability into employ-
ees’ work and personal lives, and if paid by the 
hour, earnings as well. In this article, we exam-
ine the prevalence of a broad set of scheduling 
practices in the U.S. labor market and consider 
their ramifications for workers’ experiences of 
insecurity, both economic and societal.
Precarious Work Schedules as 
a Source of Economic 
Insecurity and Institutional 
Distrust
susan j.  lambert,  julIa r.  Henly,  and jaeseung KIm
Work schedules may fuel precariousness among U.S. workers by undermining perceptions of security, both 
economic and societal. Volatile hours, limited schedule input, and short advance notice are all dimensions 
of precarious work schedules. Our analyses suggest that scheduling practices that introduce instability and 
unpredictability into workers’ lives undermine perceptions of security in unique ways for hourly and salaried 
workers. Although the data suggest that precarious scheduling practices are widespread in the labor market, 
workers who are black, young, and without a college degree appear to be at highest risk. The findings high-
light the importance of examining constellations of scheduling practices and considering the direction of 
work- hour fluctuations when investigating the ramifications of today’s scheduling practices for quality of 
employment and quality of life.
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Employer scheduling practices are part of 
broader societal transformations in which a 
growing proportion of social and economic risk 
is being shouldered by individuals and families 
rather than firms and government (Appelbaum 
and Batt 2014; Hacker 2006; Kalleberg 2011; Kal-
leberg and Vallas 2017; Lambert 2008; Standing 
2011; Weil 2014). Across industries, frontline 
managers have adopted scheduling practices 
designed to keep labor flexible, facilitating 
their ability to meet their firm’s accountability 
requirements that restrict outlays for labor. 
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Work schedules are a defining feature of the 
quality of employment. As John Robinson and 
his colleagues note, “Variations in the number 
of hours that individuals spend working pro-
vide important evidence in comparisons of the 
quality of employment across occupations, 
countries, and time” (2002, 44). Scholars lament 
that the decline of collective bargaining in the 
United States, coupled with increasing inequal-
ity in returns to human capital, is exacerbating 
stratification within the workforce, with spoils 
concentrated among the few (Kalleberg 2011; 
Standing 2011). The spoils of labor are wages 
and hours, and some workers are rich with both 
but others face a scarcity of hours at poverty 
wages (Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Schor 1993; 
Golden 2016; McCrate 2017). In addition to the 
sheer number of hours, other aspects of work 
schedules differentiate jobs in terms of their 
quality. For example, nonstandard timing jobs, 
which require work outside conventional nine- 
to- five weekday hours, are widespread and in-
terfere with family roles and worker well- being 
(Presser 2003; Staines and Pleck 1983). In addi-
tion, short advance notice of work hours, re-
gardless of timing or number, makes it difficult 
for workers to predict when they will need to 
work, complicating their ability to manage 
both work and nonwork responsibilities (Claw-
son and Gerstel 2014; Henly and Lambert 2014; 
Schneider and Harknett 2016).
Particularly relevant to the current focus is 
recent research suggesting that fluctuations in 
weekly hours—within the same job—may be a 
key source of increasing income volatility 
among U.S. households and thus a source of 
economic insecurity. Since 2013, “lack of 
money/low wages” has competed with “health 
care costs” as Americans’ top response to the 
question “What is the most important financial 
problem facing your family today?,” surpassing 
concerns about unemployment or job loss by a 
2:1 ratio (Gallup 2018a). Many households are 
strapped for cash. According to the 2016 Survey 
of Household Economics and Decisionmaking, 
fewer than half (48 percent) of adults in the 
United States have the cash on hand to cover 
an emergency requiring $400, and 30 percent 
report that they are either finding it difficult to 
get by or are just getting by (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 2017).
Instability of work hours may help explain 
why some households face difficulty paying 
bills. Recent research demonstrates that hour 
variations are an important contributor to 
growing household income volatility in the 
United States (Farrell and Greig 2016; Finnigan 
2018; Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; Morduch 
and Schneider 2017). Researchers reason that 
unstable work hours are thus also a likely 
source of insecurity both objectively, in terms 
of spurring financial crises, and subjectively, in 
terms of fostering uncertainty. Although com-
pelling evidence of these ramification is pro-
vided by targeted and qualitative research (Edin 
and Shaefer 2016; Morduch and Schneider 
2017), only recently have representative surveys 
provided data on the magnitude of work- hour 
fluctuations and the prevalence of other sched-
uling practices that may make household fi-
nances, and family life, not only unstable but 
also unpredictable. Notably, new items in re-
cent rounds of the 1997 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY97) suggest that hour vol-
atility, short advance notice, and employer- 
driven schedule control are common among 
U.S. workers (Lambert et al. 2019). The NLSY97 
only surveys young adults (in their mid- twenties 
to early thirties), however, and does not include 
measures of perceived economic or societal in-
security. It thus remains unknown how wide-
spread work- hour volatility and other precari-
ous scheduling practices are in the broader U.S. 
workforce and whether they can help explain 
workers’ experiences of insecurity.
In this article, we capitalize on new and ex-
isting questions in the General Social Survey 
(GSS), a nationally representative survey of U.S. 
residents, to advance understanding of the 
prevalence, distribution, and ramifications for 
insecurity of several dimensions of work sched-
ules that contribute to or detract from job qual-
ity. Drawing on new questions in the 2016 GSS 
that gauge the magnitude of weekly hour fluc-
tuations, length of advance notice, and worker 
input into weekly hours, we first examine 
whether problematic aspects of work schedules 
are differentially experienced by vulnerable 
subgroups of workers and address the possibil-
ity that workers may “age out” of precarious 
work schedules. We then pool multiple survey 
years, from 2002 to 2014, to examine the rela-
2 2 0  cH a ngIng  job  qua l I t y
r sf :  t he  rus sel l  s age  f oundat ion  journa l  of  the  soc i a l  s c i ence s
tionship between fundamental aspects of work 
schedules and perceived insecurity. These anal-
yses set the stage to consider how the more de-
tailed aspects of work schedules captured in 
the 2016 GSS contribute new insight into the 
relationships between scheduling practices and 
insecurity. Throughout, we differentiate work-
ers paid by the hour versus a salary given that 
earnings are a direct function of hours for the 
former but not the latter. Although our primary 
focus is on economic insecurity, we also explore 
the possibility that precarious work schedules 
fuel distrust in major institutions, which we 
conceptualize as a marker of societal insecurity.
work sChedules and  
perCeived inseCurit y 
How work hours are related to perceptions of 
insecurity may depend on the extent to which 
time and money are linked in workers’ minds. 
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Sanford DeVoe explain that 
“Time and money are particularly well- 
connected in people’s minds when they are 
paid by the hour because their income is then 
a direct function of the number of hours they 
work multiplied by their rate of pay” (Pfeffer 
and DeVoe 2012, 56). Time and money may be 
more loosely connected among those paid by a 
salary. By definition, a salary provides financial 
stability by smoothing income when demand 
or effort dips. Using data from both the 2002 
GSS and the 1988 National Survey of Families 
and Households, DeVoe and Pfeffer find that 
income and hourly status interact in explaining 
perceived happiness, with a significantly larger 
relationship among workers paid by the hour 
as compared to those paid in other ways (2009). 
It seems reasonable to conclude that because 
the fortunes of hourly workers are more directly 
tied to number of hours worked, so might be 
their perceptions of insecurity, both financial 
and societal.
Even so, fluctuating hours may not always 
undermine security, even among hourly work-
ers. The ramifications of work- hour fluctua-
tions likely depend on their direction and mag-
nitude; hours can surge up as well as plummet 
down (Lambert et al. 2019). Ramifications may 
also depend on whether work- hour fluctuations 
are by choice, and whether they are predictable. 
Moreover, as explained in the following section, 
in some circumstances, fluctuating hours may 
actually enhance job security, for both workers 
paid by salary and by the hour (Lehndorff and 
Voss- Dahm 2005; Perlow 2012), and scheduling 
practices may unsettle more than family eco-
nomics. We take these complexities into ac-
count in considering how the scheduling prac-
tices of key focus here—fluctuating weekly 
hours, advance notice, schedule input, and ir-
regular timing—may help explain workers’ per-
ceptions of economic and societal insecurity.
Fluctuating Hours and Economic Insecurity
Recent research provides evidence that insta-
bility in work hours may help account for the 
growing volatility in U.S. household income. 
For example, using records of financial trans-
actions recorded by JPMorgan Chase between 
2012 and 2015, Diane Farrell and Fiona Greig 
decompose month- to- month variation in total 
credits to personal bank accounts into within- 
job volatility (for example, the amount depos-
ited by an employer), between- job volatility 
(for example, lapses in paychecks, moves to 
new employers), and volatility in other sources 
of income (for example, public programs, re-
tirement plans, additional job) (2016). Varia-
tion in earnings within the same job, as op-
posed to variation accompanying job loss or 
mobility, accounted for the overwhelming ma-
jority of month- to- month variation in labor in-
come. Although their data do not reveal how 
workers are paid (by hour, salary, or other), Far-
rell and Greig reason that “volatility in pay-
check amounts among weekly paid jobs could 
therefore be driven by variation in hours 
worked” (2016, 28). Jonathan Morduch and Ra-
chel Schneider’s analysis of data from the U.S. 
Financial Diaries study, which recorded the fi-
nancial transactions of 235 low- income and 
middle- income families across a one- year pe-
riod (2012 to 2013), offers additional evidence 
that variation in earners’ take- home pay is a 
central driver of household income volatility; 
approximately half (47 percent) of month- to- 
month household income volatility was traced 
to fluctuations in earnings from the same job 
(2017). Most recently, Ryan Finnigan shows that 
working variable hours has become more prev-
alent since the Great Recession; the cumulative 
probability of hourly workers responding that 
r sf :  t he  rus sel l  s age  f oundat ion  journa l  of  the  soc i a l  s c i ence s
 pr ec a r Ious  worK  scHedule s  2 21
their “hours vary” increased from 37 to 47 per-
cent when comparing the four years before, 
2004 to 2007, to the four years after, 2008 to 
2012, the Great Recession (2018). Finnigan also 
finds that this increase in variable work hours 
largely accounts for the significant increase in 
earnings instability observed between the same 
time periods.
Volatility in work hours may not, however, 
dictate perceived financial insecurity. The 
meaning of fluctuating hours depends on the 
nature of the volatility. Small week- to- week fluc-
tuations may do little to inform workers’ per-
ceived financial security, and whether work 
hours surge above or fall below usual or full- 
time hours makes a difference for household 
finances. Morduch and Schneider find that, on 
average, the families in their sample experi-
enced 2.5 months with income at least 25 per-
cent above and 2.5 months with income at least 
25 percent below their annual monthly average 
(2017). Using data from the NLSY97 (2012 to 
2013), Susan Lambert and her colleagues find 
that the majority of variation in weekly hour 
fluctuations during a one- month period was 
due to surges above usual hours (2019). Thus, 
the extent to which fluctuating work hours ex-
acerbate or reduce workers’ assessments of fi-
nancial insecurity may depend on their magni-
tude and direction, especially among hourly 
workers whose earnings are most closely tied 
to the number of hours they work.
The relationship between fluctuating hours 
and job insecurity is also complex. Workers 
who incur fluctuations in work hours may do 
so as a means of demonstrating their commit-
ment to an employer. In many hourly jobs, 
open availability—the willingness and ability 
to incur fluctuations in work hours, such as 
surges and shortfalls—has become a valued 
form of human capital as managers strive to 
implement labor flexibility to control outlays 
for labor (Carré and Tilly 2017; Haley- Lock and 
Ewert 2011; Lambert 2008; Lehndorff and Voss- 
Dahm 2005). For example, a study of a national 
U.S. retailer indicates that hourly sales associ-
ates who put constraints on their availability 
received fewer hours than their more available 
counterparts, controlling for work- hour prefer-
ences (Lambert, Haley- Lock, and Henly 2012). 
Several studies document that being willing 
and able to incur fluctuations in work hours is 
also highly valued in many salaried jobs. For 
example, Leslie Perlow’s research demon-
strates how organizations create norms among 
software engineers and consultants that foster 
a culture of working through deadlines and an-
swering off- hour calls from bosses and clients 
(1997, 2012). Face time is used as a marker of 
employee performance, with career penalties 
incurred for those unable or unwilling to work 
on demand and at short notice. Whether pen-
alties and payoffs are real or imagined, per-
ceived job insecurity is typically conceptualized 
as a subjective uncertainty (see, for example, 
De Witte and Näswall 2003; Lee, Bobko, and 
Chen 2006) that has both cognitive and affec-
tive components (Huang et al. 2012). In today’s 
workplaces, then, incurring fluctuating hours 
may be experienced as protection against job 
insecurity rather than a marker of it, by both 
hourly and salaried workers.
Schedule Input and Economic Insecurity
Whether fluctuations in the number of work 
hours exacerbate or mitigate economic insecu-
rity may depend on who determines them. 
Work hours that are the result of workers’ pref-
erences are likely to be experienced as flexibility 
by workers (Jones 2017; Matos and Galinsky 
2011). But when variation is employer driven, 
workers are more likely to experience it as un-
certainty, and we posit, as a source of insecurity 
(Clawson and Gerstel 2014; Fugiel and Lambert 
2019; Henly, Shaefer, and Waxman 2006; Lam-
bert et al. 2019; McCrate 2012). Recent vignette 
studies—both a controlled experiment of ap-
plicants for jobs in a call center and a web- 
based representative panel—suggest that work-
ers place a great deal of value on avoiding 
employer control over the timing of work shifts 
(Mas and Pallais 2016). To our knowledge, the 
2016 GSS is the first nationally representative 
survey in the United States to include items 
about the extent of employee input into the 
number and timing of work hours.
In this article, we examine how input into 
both the number and timing of hours varies by 
worker characteristics, including age, gender, 
race, education, and occupation; we then ex-
plore how both types of schedule input may 
help explain perceived economic insecurity 
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alone and in combination with work- hour vola-
tility. It seems reasonable to expect that lack of 
input would contribute to financial insecurity, 
especially when work hours are highly volatile. 
Whether lack of employee input is related to 
job insecurity is less clear. On the one hand, 
employer- driven scheduling may lead workers 
to feel that they are fulfilling necessary busi-
ness functions; on the other hand, having no 
input into their hours may make them feel un-
dervalued and expendable. We do not antici-
pate that relationships between economic in-
security and schedule input into number or 
timing of hours will vary for hourly and salaried 
workers because we do not have a theoretical 
reason to expect that control is more or less 
important to insecurity based on how a worker 
is paid, net of other differences.
Advance Notice and Economic Insecurity
Schedule unpredictability concerns the diffi-
culty workers have anticipating when they will 
and will not work. Research demonstrates that 
unpredictability is associated with elevated lev-
els of work stress and work- to- life conflict, and 
for workers paid by the hour, unpredictable 
hours mean unpredictable earnings (Clawson 
and Gerstel 2014; Henly and Lambert 2014). The 
further in advance workers know when they will 
need to work, the more certain they can be of 
hours and earnings. Thus, lengthy advance no-
tice may foster a sense of financial security and 
short notice may undermine it. Lengthy ad-
vance notice may also foster job security by en-
abling workers to manage personal responsi-
bilities in ways that do not interfere with work 
responsibilities (Henly and Lambert 2014). The 
Quality of Work Life supplement to the 2014 
GSS and recent rounds of the NLSY97 have in-
cluded comparable questions on advance 
schedule notice. In the 2014 GSS, fully 40 per-
cent of hourly workers reported that they know 
when they will need to work a week or less in 
advance, the shortest length of notice included 
as a response category. The percentage of work-
ers reporting a week or less notice is somewhat 
lower in the NLSY97 (Round 16), with hourly 
workers (30.3 percent) more likely to receive a 
week or less notice than nonhourly workers 
(22.5 percent). The 2016 GSS includes refined 
response categories that allows us to unpack a 
week or less advance notice into a day or less, 
two to three days, or four to seven days. We ex-
amine how length of advance notice varies by 
worker and occupational characteristics and 
then explore how short advance notice may 
help explain perceived economic insecurity 
alone and in combination with hour volatility 
and schedule input. We anticipate that short 
notice will increase the probability of financial 
and job insecurity, especially in the context of 
hour volatility and low input, and that the rela-
tionship to financial insecurity will be espe-
cially strong for workers in hourly jobs—be-
cause of the additional ramifications of short 
notice for financial budgeting.
Work Schedules and Societal Insecurity
Precarious scheduling practices also have po-
tential ramifications for noneconomic forms of 
insecurity. As Richard Sennett observes, 
“What’s peculiar about uncertainty today is 
that it exists without any looming historical di-
saster; instead it is woven into the everyday 
practices of a vigorous capitalism” (1998, 31). 
Nothing is more everyday in capitalism than 
work hours and schedules. We posit that the 
uncertainty introduced into daily life through 
precarious scheduling practices may fatigue 
workers’ trust broadly. We explore this possibil-
ity by examining the relationship between pre-
carious scheduling practices and workers’ dis-
trust of societal institutions.
Confidence in many major institutions—
from Congress to the clergy—has declined 
since the 1970s (Gallup 2018b; Pew Research 
Center 2017). For example, when asked how 
much confidence “you, yourself have” in Con-
gress, in 1973 (following the Watergate crisis), 
42 percent of those polled responded “a great 
deal” or “quite a lot,” but only 11 percent re-
sponded similarly in 2018 (Gallup 2018b). Simi-
larly, although 65 percent of poll participants 
reported confidence in organized religion in 
1973, only 38 percent did so in 2018.
Explanations for the increase in institu-
tional distrust are varied. Some authors point 
to uncertainties introduced through increasing 
globalization, others stress the dismantling of 
local community power (for a review, see 
Abramson and Inglehart 1995); others empha-
size increasing income inequality and a belief 
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in meritocracy (Hayes 2012) or processes of so-
cial modernization (Dalton 2005). Building on 
Sennett (1998), we explore the possibility that 
distrust in institutions may also spring from 
more mundane uncertainties. Regardless of 
how paid, unstable, unpredictable work hours 
over which workers have little control may in-
troduce uncertainty into the core of work and 
family life, shaking confidence that societal in-
stitutions act in the best interests of people like 
them.
rese arCh Questions
1. What is the prevalence of precarious work 
schedules in the U.S. labor market? How are 
distinct features of work schedules distrib-
uted across population subgroups by per-
sonal and job characteristics? Do workers 
age out of precarious work schedules?
2. How are fundamental features of work 
schedules related to financial insecurity, job 
insecurity, and institutional distrust?
3. How are more nuanced features of work 
schedules related to economic (financial 
and job) and societal (distrust in institu-
tions) insecurity? Specifically, does the 
magnitude and direction of work- hour fluc-
tuations, short advance notice and lack of 
schedule input—alone and in combina-
tion—explain perceived insecurity? Do rela-
tionships vary for workers paid by the hour 
and a salary?
Methods
The General Social Survey, begun in 1972, is a 
cross- sectional, nationally representative 
personal- interview survey of adults age eigh-
teen years or older living in the United States. 
It uses an equal probability, multistage cluster 
sample design for selecting housing units in 
the entire United States.
Data and Sample
We conduct two sets of analyses. First, we com-
bine GSS surveys from 2002, 2006, 2010, and 
2014 to examine the relationships between fun-
damental aspects of work schedules and finan-
cial insecurity, job insecurity, and distrust in 
institutions; the sample includes respondents 
who were currently in the wage and salary work-
force in those years (N = 3,564). Second, we use 
the 2016 GSS, which incorporated the Fluctuat-
ing Work Hours Module (developed by authors 
Susan Lambert and Julia Henly) in the 3rd bal-
lot of the core survey. This sample is composed 
of respondents in the wage and salary work-
force who responded to the 2016 Module (N = 
525). The 2016 data are not included in the com-
bined multiyear data set because questions ask-
ing about type of schedule and input into tim-
ing are different in 2016, as detailed in our 
section on measures. We weight variables to 
improve population representation.
Analytic Approach
To address the first research question, we pres-
ent descriptive statistics on fundamental as-
pects of scheduling available in the GSS prior 
to 2016 using the multiyear pooled data set and 
on more nuanced scheduling features using 
data from the 2016 Fluctuating Work Hour 
Module. With 2016 data, we present personal 
(gender, race, age, education) and occupational 
(part time or full time, occupation, union sta-
tus, level of earnings) subgroup differences. To 
address the remaining research questions, we 
estimate a series of linear (indices of financial 
insecurity and institutional distrust) and logis-
tic (dichotomous variable indicating job inse-
curity) regressions that sequentially introduce 
different aspects of work schedules, alone and 
then in combination. It is not our goal to esti-
mate the relative contribution of each dimen-
sion but rather to examine how distinct dimen-
sions and constellations may be differentially 
related to different types of insecurity, as dis-
cussed in the literature review. These models 
include a block of control variables that capture 
worker characteristics shown to be associated 
with labor market opportunities and outcomes, 
including age (age2), race, gender, education, 
household income, number of children, spouse 
and whether spouse works, and whether re-
spondent works more than one job.1 We esti-
mate models separately for hourly and salaried 
1. Definitions of control variables are included in the online appendix (https://www.rsfjournal.org/content 
/5/4/218/tab-supplemental).
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workers.2 The data are cross- sectional, and our 
findings can only offer associational knowl-
edge.
We also conduct sensitivity analyses that 
add occupation, industry, union status, and 
relative earnings into the main models. To 
avoid model misspecification, we do not enter 
these variables in our primary models; con-
ceptually, one path through which occupation, 
industry, and union membership may affect 
economic insecurity is through scheduling 
practices. Sensitivity analyses also include in-
dices capturing workers’ overall optimism and 
hopefulness for achieving life goals to take into 
account the possibility that workers’ individual 
outlook may color their assessment of their 
work schedule and also their finances and con-
fidence in institutions. The addition of these 
variables does little to change our results, and 
we thus summarize the findings from the sen-
sitivity analyses in the online appendix.
Measures of Insecurity
We define the dependent and key independent 
variables we employ in the regressions.3 Distri-
butions on all variables are presented in table 
1 and table 2, broken out for hourly and salary 
workers.
Financial insecurity is an index on which 
higher scores indicate greater insecurity. The 
index averages respondents’ assessments of 
satisfaction with their current standard of liv-
ing, their prospects of improving their standard 
of living, and how they think their standard of 
living compares to others in America and to 
their parents (items were standardized before 
averaging because questions used different re-
sponse scales). Although this index has modest 
reliability (alpha = 0.51 in the multiyear and 
0.54 in the 2016 GSS), each item added to reli-
ability (that is, subtracting any item would have 
lowered estimated reliability). Moreover, the 
results of an exploratory factor analysis are con-
sistent with a one- factor solution; each of these 
items met the convention of loading on a single 
factor at the level of 0.4 or higher. Perhaps most 
important, the overall pattern of results is sub-
stantively the same, showing only minor varia-
tions, when the individual items rather than 
the index are used (results available from the 
authors).
Job insecurity is a dichotomous variable that 
differentiates workers reporting job insecurity 
(coded 1) or not (coded 0). It is measured differ-
ently in the multiyear and 2016 data. In the mul-
tiyear data, it is measured by a single question 
that asks how true it is that “The job security 
is good.” Workers are coded as job insecure if 
they respond “not too true” or “not at all true.” 
In the 2016 data, job insecurity combines re-
sponses from two survey questions that ask 
about the extent to which workers worry about 
the possibility of losing their job and how dif-
ficult or easy it would be to find a job as good 
as their current one. Workers are coded as ex-
periencing job insecurity if they say they worry 
at least a little about losing their job and they 
also think it will be fairly or very difficult to find 
another one.
Institutional distrust is an index, with higher 
scores indicating greater institutional distrust. 
The index averages responses to whether “you 
would say you have a great deal of confidence, 
only some confidence, or hardly any confi-
dence” in each of a set of institutions. Our in-
dex averages together confidence in major com-
panies, education, the executive branch of 
government, the U.S. Supreme Court, Con-
2. Little data were missing on the independent and control variables in the multiyear and 2016 GSS. The most 
data were missing on household income, which had 7.8 percent missing in the multiyear data (and 14 percent 
missing on respondents’ earnings) and 5.5 percent missing (16 percent missing on respondents’ earnings) in the 
2016 GSS. Missing data on the remaining independent and control variables ranged from 1 to 2 percent. Because 
of the low proportion of missing responses on any one variable, we simply filled in missing data on the indepen-
dent and control variables with the mean, normed separately for hourly and salaried subsamples as appropriate.
3. An online appendix presents the survey questions included in the Fluctuating Work Hours Module as well as 
the questions on economic insecurity and institutional distrust (https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/5/4/218/tab 
-supplemental). We constructed numerous alternative measures of both financial insecurity and fluctuating 
work hours to estimate sensitivity of findings to measurement decisions. The significant and statistically non-
significant findings reported in this article largely hold regardless of measure or model.
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gress, banks and financial institutions, orga-
nized labor, the press, and banks and financial 
institutions (alpha = 0.72 in both the multiyear 
and 2016 GSS).
Measures of Work Schedules in  
Multiyear GSS Data
Hours worked last week is the total number of 
hours workers reported working at all jobs in 
the past week; workers not working because of 
illness or vacation are asked to report typical 
hours. Note that this question asks about hours 
worked at all jobs; 18 percent of hourly workers 
and 14 percent of salaried workers reported 
they held more than one job.
Workers are asked whether they usually 
work a day, afternoon, night, split, irregular–
on- call, or rotating shift. Irregular shift is coded 
1 if working an irregular–on- call shift and 0 oth-
erwise. Nonregular timing is coded 1 if working 
anything other than a day, afternoon, or night 
shift and 0 otherwise.
Little or no input into timing of hours is coded 
1 if workers responded rarely or never to a ques-
tion asking how often they are allowed to 
change their starting and quitting time on a 
daily basis.
Irregular with no input is coded 1 when ir-
regular shift is equal to 1 and lack of input into 
timing is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.
Nonregular with no input is coded 1 when 
nonregular timing is equal to 1 and lack of in-
put into timing is also equal to 1, and 0 other-
wise.
Measures of Work Schedules in 2016 GSS
Usual hours is the number of hours respondents 
reported they typically work each week at all 
jobs; 14 percent of hourly workers and 11 per-
cent of salaried workers in the 2016 GSS re-
ported holding more than one job.
Relative instability measures the magnitude 
of fluctuations in weekly work hours during the 
past month, conditioned on usual work hours. 
It is developed from three survey questions: 
usual work hours, the most hours worked a 
week in the past month (including overtime 
and work at home and other places), and the 
least hours worked a week in the past month 
(not including weeks with vacation or sick 
time). These questions refer to work at all jobs. 
This measure of magnitude can be likened to 
a coefficient of variation as it norms the abso-
lute difference of most and least hours by aver-
age or usual work hours: [most–least] ÷ usual. 
For example, an eight- hour difference between 
most and least weekly hours may have different 
consequences for workers who usually work 
forty- eight hours versus sixteen hours a week. 
In the first case, variation in hours is 17 percent 
of a worker’s usual hours (relative instability 
ratio of 0.17) whereas in the second case, varia-
tion amounts to 50 percent of usual hours (rel-
ative instability ratio of 0.50).
Direction of work- hour volatility is assessed 
with three variables that calculate the propor-
tion of the difference between greatest and few-
est weekly hours that indicates an hour short-
fall (below usual hours) or an hour surge (above 
usual and above full- time hours). For example, 
the proportion of variation due to a surge above 
full time (which we define as working more 
than forty- five hours a week) is calculated as 
[greatest hours–forty- five] ÷ [greatest- fewest]. 
To conserve space, significant findings related 
to the direction of volatility are reported in the 
text but not tables.
Little or no work- hour input is a dichotomous 
variable that differentiates workers who indi-
cated that the total number of hours they work 
each week is “decided by my employer with lit-
tle or no input from me” (coded 1), from work-
ers who indicated more input (coded 0).
No input into work timing is a dichotomous 
variable that is coded 1 if workers chose the re-
sponse “Starting and finishing times are de-
cided by my employer and I cannot change 
them on my own” and 0 if they responded that 
they can decide the times they work within cer-
tain limits or completely on their own.
Nonregular timing is a dichotomous variable 
that is comparable, but not identical, to the 
nonregular timing variable constructed using 
the multiyear data. In the 2016 GSS, we coded 
workers 0 on nonregular timing if they chose “I 
have a regular schedule or shift (daytime, eve-
ning, or night)” when asked about their usual 
work schedule in their main job. They are coded 
1 if they chose either of the other two alterna-
tives of working a schedule or shift that regu-
larly changes (“for example, from days to eve-
nings or to nights”) or one “where working 
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times are decided at short notice” by their em-
ployer.
Week or less notice is a dichotomous variable 
that differentiates workers who indicated they 
know what days and hours they will need to 
work seven or fewer days in advance (coded 1) 
from workers who reported longer notice or 
that their schedule never changes (coded 0).
Volatility plus little input into number is coded 
1 when relative instability is at least 0.25 and 
little or no work- hour input is coded 1; other 
workers are coded 0.
Volatility plus short notice is coded 1 when 
relative instability is at least 0.25 and week or 
less notice is coded 1; other workers are coded 
0.
Volatility plus little input into timing is coded 
1 when relative instability is at least 0.25 and no 
input into work timing is coded 1; other workers 
are coded 0.
Short notice plus little input into timing is 
coded 1 when week or less notice is coded 1 and 
no input into timing is coded 1; other workers are 
coded 0.
Short notice plus little input into number is 
coded 1 when week or less notice is coded 1 and 
little or no work- hour input is coded 1; other 
workers are coded 0.
results
In the following section, we present findings 
on the prevalence of precarious work sched-
ules, first using the multiyear GSS data and 
then the more nuanced data on work schedules 
available in the 2016 GSS. We then present find-
ings on the association of these work schedule 
variables with economic insecurity and distrust 
in institutions, using the multiyear and the 
2016 data.
Prevalence and Distribution of  
Precarious Scheduling Practices
To address the first research question, we first 
present the prevalence of the fundamental fea-
tures of work schedules for workers paid a sal-
ary and by the hour, using multiple years of the 
GSS. We then examine the full set of more nu-
anced features of work schedules available in 
the 2016 GSS. We discuss key differences in the 
distribution of each dimension of work sched-
ules for workers paid a salary and by the hour, 
and for the 2016 data, how they are distributed 
across workers with distinct personal and job 
characteristics. Overall, the data suggest that 
today’s labor market is highly stratified in 
terms of how much input workers have into the 
timing and number of work hours, how widely 
weekly work hours fluctuate, and how far in ad-
vance workers know when they will need to 
work.
Fundamental Features of Work Schedules  
Using Multiyear GSS Data Set
Using data across multiple years of the GSS, we 
examine the number of work hours reported in 
the week prior to the survey, the extent of input 
into the starting and finishing times of work, 
and the percentage of respondents who report 
having a schedule with nonregular work timing 
(see table 1). Overall, respondents report work-
ing an average of 41.6 hours in the prior week, 
and hourly workers report statistically signifi-
cantly fewer hours (38.9) than salaried workers 
(45.6). Hourly workers also report statistically 
significantly less input into their work schedule 
timing, with 60 percent of hourly and 37 per-
cent of salaried workers reporting that their 
employer decides their starting and finishing 
times without their input. Work schedules that 
are mostly nonregular, meaning employees 
work primarily irregular, on- call, split, or rotat-
ing shifts, are not highly prevalent in the sam-
ple, but nevertheless, characterize an impor-
tant minority of workers’ schedules (9.8 percent 
of salaried workers and 15.3 percent of hourly 
workers). The hourly- salary difference is re-
duced to nonsignificance when the definition 
of nonregular timing is restricted to only those 
respondents who work irregular or on- call 
shifts.
Nonregular timing may be especially diffi-
cult for workers without input into work sched-
ule timing. These data suggest, however, that 
only a small minority of workers have both lim-
ited input into the timing of their work sched-
ule and an irregular or on- call shift, although 
experiencing both together is somewhat more 
common for hourly workers and when the def-
inition of nonregular is expanded to include ir-
regular, on- call, split, and rotating shifts. The 
multiyear data illustrate important subgroup 
differences beyond the hourly- salary distinc-
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in Regressions with Multiyear Data
Hourly
(n=1,458)
Salary
(n=2,141)
Total
(n=3,599)
Dependent variables
Financial insecurity 0.09 (0.63) –0.18 (0.63)** –0.01 (0.65)
Job insecurity 16.6 12.9* 15.1
Distrust in institutions 2.1 (0.4) 2.1 (0.4) 2.1 (0.4)
Independent variables 
Number of work hours last week 38.9 (13.5) 45.6 (13.0)** 41.6 (13.7)
Little or no input into timing 60.0 37.0* 50.8
Irregular or on-call shift 5.4 6.5 5.8
Nonregular timing (irregular, on-call, split,  
or rotating)
15.3 9.8** 13.1
Little or no input and irregular or on-call shift 2.7 1.2* 2.1
Little or no input and nonregular timing 9.6 3.2** 7.0
Control variables
Age 40.5 (13.8) 44.1 (12.1)** 41.9 (13.3)
Race 
White, non-Hispanic 62.8 78.3** 69.0
Black 19.1 7.9** 14.6
Hispanic 15.2 8** 12.3
Other 3.0 5.7** 4.1
Female 55.3 50.6 53.4
High school or less 76.4 31.9** 58.6
Household incomea
1 (<$20,499) 26.9 5.9** 18.4
2 ($20,500~$36,399) 23.9 12.4** 19.2
3 ($36,400~$58,999) 22.4 22.6 22.5
4 ($59,000~$87,999) 15.4 23.6** 18.7
5 ($88,000<=) 11.4 35.5** 21.2
Low pay 33.7 33.4 33.6
No partner or spouse 52.6 36.7** 46.3
Spouse does not work 13.8 17.1^ 15.1
Have children 18 or younger 35.2 32.4 34.1
Has more than one job 17.9 13.9* 16.3
Occupation
Management, business, office, admin support 22.9 40.9** 30.1
Professional, related fields 15.4 34.6** 23.1
Service, sales, related fields 34.7 15.6** 27.1
Construction, production, transport, natural 
resources
26.9 8.9** 19.7
Union 12.6 13.8 13.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on combined waves of the General Social Survey (Smith et al. 
2018), years 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014.
Note: Percentages and means (standard deviations). Significance difference between hourly and salary 
workers.
aIncome in constant dollars, inflation-adjusted to year 2000.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
2 2 8  cH a ngIng  job  qua l I t y
r sf :  t he  rus sel l  s age  f oundat ion  journa l  of  the  soc i a l  s c i ence s
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in Regressions, 2016 GSS 
Hourly
(n=334)
Salary
(n=191)
Total
(n=525)
Dependent variables
Financial insecurity 0.13 (0.65) –0.28 (0.60)** –0.01 (0.66)
Job insecurity 23.3 26.6 24.5
Distrust in institutions 2.1 (0.4) 2.1 (0.4) 2.1 (0.4)
Independent variables 
Usual hours 38.4 (11.7) 44.8 (12.5)** 40.7 (12.4)
Magnitude of volatility (relative instability ratio) 0.37 (0.54) 0.33 (0.40)** 0.35 (0.49)
Working hours decided by employer (no input into 
hours)
47.4 35.0* 42.9
Timing decided by employer (no input into timing) 64.5 33.6** 53.5
Nonregular timing 24.1 17.0 21.6
Week or less notice (short notice) 39.9 30.7 36.6
Volatility plus no input into the number of hours 18.2 12.7 16.2
Volatility plus short notice 27.4 21.1 25.1
Volatility plus no input into timing 27.8 12.7** 22.4
Short notice plus no input into timing 26.4 8.6 20.0
Short notice plus no input into number of hours 
hours
15.2 7.1* 12.3
Control variables
Age 43.0 (14.1) 44.9 (12.5) 43.7 (13.6)
Race 
White, non-Hispanic 57.3 72.5** 62.8
Black 18.7 10.1** 15.6
Hispanic 19.6 10.6* 16.4
Other 4.4 6.8 5.2
Female 58.2 48.7* 54.8
High school or less 73.0 33.6** 58.8
Household income 
1 (<$29,999) 26.8 8.0** 19.9
2 ($30,000~$49,999) 19.6 10.7* 16.3
3 ($50,000~$89,999) 36.9 26.9^ 33.2
4 ($90,000~$109,999) 6.6 11.9* 8.6
5 ($110,000<=) 10.2 42.5** 22.1
Low pay 34.9 28.7 32.6
No partner or spouse 51.4 34.5** 45.4
Spouse does not work 14.0 15.9 14.7
Have children 18 or younger 29.9 32.3 30.8
Has more than one job 14.1 11.2 13.1
Occupation
Management, business, office, admin support 23.4 37.7** 28.5
Professional, related fields 18.1 35.4** 24.3
Service, sales, related fields 34.3 17.6** 28.3
Construction, production, transport, natural 
resources
24.2 9.3** 18.9
Union 9.6 10.2 10.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Percentages and means (standard deviations). Significance difference between hourly and salary 
workers.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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tion in the distribution of these fundamental 
features of work schedules (see table A1). For 
brevity, we do not describe these differences 
here, and instead elaborate important sub-
group trends in our discussion of the 2016 de-
scriptive statistics.
Features of Work Schedules in the 2016 GSS
The 2016 data allow us to supplement the work 
schedule variables available in the multiyear 
data with items that assess work- hour fluctua-
tions, employee input into the number of hours 
they work, and the advance notice workers re-
ceive about their work schedule. In addition to 
providing for the first time these more nuanced 
assessments of work schedule dimensions in a 
nationally representative sample of U.S. work-
ers, the 2016 data include measures of the usual 
hours of work each week, work schedule tim-
ing, and nonregular hours. These measures are 
worded slightly differently than prior waves, 
but tap into the same constructs as those re-
ported in table 1. The overall descriptive statis-
tics of all work schedule variables in the 2016 
data are presented in table 2.
Work- Hour Fluctuations
The 2016 data indicate salaried workers report 
usually working 44.8 hours per week, relative to 
38.4 hours per week among workers paid by the 
hour, a statistically significant difference. As 
shown in table 3, the overwhelming majority of 
both hourly (79.2 percent) and salaried (81.6 
percent) workers reported at least some fluc-
tuations in weekly work hours during the one 
month queried in the 2016 GSS. The absolute 
difference between the most and least number 
of hours worked during a week of the month 
averaged more than a full day’s work, at 13.2 
hours. On average, hours fluctuated by 35 per-
cent of what workers report as their usual 
hours, with hourly workers (0.37) reporting 
slightly more relative instability than salaried 
workers (0.33), though the difference is not sta-
tistically significant. The prevalence and mag-
nitude of fluctuating hours observed in the 
2016 GSS is comparable to that found in the 
NLSY97 (Round 16) data; more than 70 percent 
of the early- career employees in the NLSY97 re-
port some fluctuations in weekly hours (Lam-
bert et al. 2019). In both the GSS (0.35) and 
NLSY07 (0.34), the relative instability ratios 
among hourly workers are enough to suggest 
that fluctuations in number of work hours may 
play a substantial role in helping account for 
the earnings volatility observed in recent re-
search, such as the reported 20 percent month 
to month (Farrell and Greig 2016).
Subgroups vary on number of usual hours 
and the magnitude of fluctuations in work 
hours in ways that mostly align with socioeco-
nomic status (for example, lower- status work-
ers report fewer usual hours and more fluctua-
tions) but not always. Differences between 
hourly and salaried workers are shown for each 
dimension of work schedules in table 3. Con-
sistent with research (for a review, see Frazis 
and Stewart 2014), salaried workers report 
working more hours than hourly workers, and 
this difference is especially pronounced for 
whites, higher educated workers, and workers 
in professional, service, and sales occupations. 
The difference in usual hours worked is espe-
cially large between hourly and salaried work-
ers not covered by a union contract. Workers 
twenty- six and younger, especially those in 
hourly jobs, report the largest absolute differ-
ence between the most and least number of 
weekly hours of any group; they are also among 
the highest in terms of relative instability. The 
magnitude of fluctuating hours among part- 
time hourly workers, whether measured in ab-
solute or relative terms, is greater than among 
full- time hourly workers. Although relative in-
stability varies significantly by race within both 
hourly and salary groups (significant levels not 
shown in table), it is white hourly workers who 
report the greatest relative instability.
Overall, the findings reported in table 3 sug-
gest that a substantial proportion of workers 
across the U.S. workforce experience sizable 
fluctuations in weekly work hours, regardless 
of personal and job characteristics. But know-
ing the magnitude of the fluctuations may not 
be enough to understand the conditions under 
which fluctuations serve to mitigate or exacer-
bate financial insecurity.
Employee Input into Timing of Weekly Hours
Table 4 indicates that almost two- thirds (64.5 
percent) of hourly workers and one- third (33.6 
percent) of salaried workers report that the 
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starting and finishing times of their work shifts 
are decided by their employer. Only 3.5 percent 
of hourly workers report that they are entirely 
free to decide their starting and finishing times, 
versus almost one- fifth (18.1 percent) of salaried 
workers. Despite these statistically significant 
differences in schedule input between hourly 
and salaried workers in the sample overall, sev-
eral subgroups of workers, even when paid by 
salary, nevertheless report little to no input into 
their work schedules. For example, as with their 
hourly counterparts, large shares of salaried Af-
rican Americans (64.1 percent), workers twenty- 
six and younger (49.9 percent), and workers 
with a high school education or less (49.6 per-
cent) report that starting and finishing times 
are decided by their employer. Service, sales, 
and related fields also provide salaried workers 
limited input into their schedule (60.5 percent). 
In addition, more than 70 percent of workers 
in jobs covered by a union contract also report 
that their start and end times are controlled by 
their employer whether salaried or paid by the 
hour. It may be that the timing of shifts in 
union jobs has been a matter of collective bar-
gaining, but workers see it as solely employer 
driven because employers are the ones who 
construct the work schedule.
Employee Input into Number of Weekly Hours
Table 5 shows that almost half of hourly work-
ers and more than one- third of salaried workers 
report that the total number of hours they work 
each week is decided by their employer with 
little or no input from them (see table 5, figures 
1 and 2). Salaried workers are more than twice 
as likely as hourly workers (36.6 versus 16.7 per-
cent) to report controlling the number of hours 
they work each week either freely or within lim-
its set by their employer. White workers paid by 
salary are significantly less likely than workers 
of other races or ethnicities, regardless of how 
paid, to report little or no input into the num-
ber of hours they work (significance levels for 
comparisons across race not reported on table). 
At almost 60 percent, black hourly workers are 
particularly likely to report not having a say into 
the number of hours they work. The lack of 
work- hour control that black hourly workers re-
port suggests that the lower relative instability 
in weekly work hours they incur relative to 
white workers (see table 3) may be more a mat-
ter of employer practice than employee choice.
Input into the number of weekly hours var-
ies in important ways for hourly and salaried 
workers across occupations and by union sta-
tus. Workers with the least input into their 
hours are in hourly administrative support jobs 
(52 percent) and service and sales jobs (47.2 per-
cent), and construction, production, and trans-
portation jobs whether paid by the hour (53.2 
percent) or by salary (50.3 percent). Regarding 
union status, it is non- unionized hourly work-
ers (48.2 percent) and unionized salaried work-
ers (57.9 percent) who report the least input 
into the number of hours they work. Again, the 
unionized salaried workers may have input 
through collective bargaining that is not re-
flected in their subjective reports of their input 
into work hours.
Overall, like fluctuations in work hours, the 
distribution of work- hour input both for timing 
and number of hours across subgroups sug-
gests that although a substantial proportion of 
today’s workers may not control the starting 
and finishing times of their workday and may 
have limited input into the number of hours 
they work each week, some groups are clearly 
at higher risk than others, in ways that mostly 
mirror broader stratification in the labor mar-
ket and society.
Advance Schedule Notice
The descriptive trends regarding the advance 
schedule notice that workers receive indicate 
marked bifurcation in the labor market. On the 
one hand, almost half of workers (48.2 percent 
overall) report either that they know their work 
schedule four weeks or more in advance or that 
their schedule never changes, but on the other 
hand, more than one- third (36 percent) report 
one week or less advance notice in their work 
schedule (see figures 3 and 4 and table 6). The 
relative consistency in workers’ reports in the 
2016 GSS, the 2014 GSS, and Round 16 of the 
NLSY97 offers some confidence in these esti-
mates of advance schedule notice, and suggests 
that experiencing a week or less schedule notice 
is the norm for an important minority of work-
ers in today’s labor market.
The 2016 GSS further breaks down the “one 
week or less” category (see table 6). These data 
(Text continues on p. 236.)
r sf :  t he  rus sel l  s age  f oundat ion  journa l  of  the  soc i a l  s c i ence s
 pr ec a r Ious  worK  scHedule s  2 3 3
Table 4. Descriptives of Input into Starting and Finishing Times of Work, 2016 GSS
Employer Decides
Employee Decides 
Within Limits Employee Decides
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
All employees 64.5 33.6** 32.0 48.3** 3.5 18.1**
Men 66.3 30.3** 31.1 50.3** 2.6 19.4*
Women 63.2 37.1** 32.6 46.1** 4.2 16.8*
Race
White 62.2 30.7** 34.7 46.2** 3.1 23.2**
Black 77.2 64.1 16.8 28.4* 6.0 7.5
Hispanic 61.8 37.5 36.2 58.1 2.1 4.4
Age 
26 and younger 69.7 49.9 30.4 40.4 0.0 9.7
27–35 60.0 36.3** 33.3 43.9^ 6.7 19.8*
36–45 53.6 33.3* 42.5 55.7* 3.9 11.0
46–54 70.0 23.6** 24.7 50.0** 5.3 26.5*
55–64 74.8 38.6** 23.8 47.1^ 1.3 14.3*
65 and older 62.4 35.4 33.5 33.3 4.0 31.3
Work hours
Full time 67.5 33.6** 29.4 49.4** 3.1 17.0**
Part time 54.7 33.9 40.4 38.2 4.9 27.9^
Education
High school or less 68.3 49.6* 48.2 27.6 2.5 11.2*
More than high school, less  
than four-year college
48.2 27.6 50.3 40.9 1.5 31.4^
College degree or more 56.9 25.7** 34.7 54.2 8.3 20.1
Earnings
Low pay 65.3 49.8^ 29.7 34.4 5.0 15.7*
Higher pay 62.4 27.0** 35.0 54.8** 2.7 18.2**
Occupation
Management, business, 
office, admin support
47.2 19.2** 45.7 50.8 7.1 30.0**
Professional, related fields 52.9 34.0^ 40.8 52.9 6.3 13.1
Service, sales, related fields 74.4 60.5 23.3 31.7 2.3 7.8
Construction, production, 
transport, natural resources
74.5 45.0^ 25.5 46.0 0.0 9.0
Union
Non-union 63.4 29.5** 33.2 50.9** 3.3 19.5**
Union 73.9 70.9 20.8 23.7 5.3 5.3
Total (N) 51.3 (266) 40.2 (208) 8.5 (44)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Percentages and means (standard deviations). All percentages are weighted. Total sample size is 
525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaried workers.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Figure 1. Hourly Employees: Input into Number of Hours
47%
31%
12%
5%
5%
Employee has little or no input
Employee has some input
Employee decides within limits
Employee decides freely
Outside of control of employer 
and employee
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Figure 2. Salaried Employees: Input into Number of Hours
Employee has little or no input
Employee has some input
Employee decides within limits
Employee decides freely
Outside of control of employer 
and employee
35%
22%
27%
10%
6%
show that subgroups of workers are subject to 
(or in some cases may choose) even less than 
one week’s notice of their work hours. In fact, 
almost half of those with one week or less no-
tice report that they know when they need to 
work only a day or less in advance. Hourly work-
ers who are male (28.0 percent), Hispanic (29.7 
percent), or have at most a high school degree 
(20.3 percent) are especially likely to have ad-
vance notice in their work schedule of a day or 
less. Hourly union workers are also subject to 
last- minute scheduling (25.6 percent). Despite 
the overall high rates of short notice among 
hourly workers, salaried workers are not im-
mune to last- minute notice, particularly sala-
ried workers of color; about a quarter of black 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Figure 3. Hourly Employees: Advance Notice
17%
10%
13%
13%5%
8%
34% 1 day or less in advance
2 to 3 days in advance
4 to 7 days in advance
1 to 2 weeks in advance
3 to 4 weeks in advance
Over 4 weeks in advance
Schedule never changes
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Figure 4. Salaried Employees: Advance Notice
1 day or less in advance
2 to 3 days in advance
4 to 7 days in advance
1 to 2 weeks in advance
3 to 4 weeks in advance
Over 4 weeks in advance
Schedule never changes
15%
9%
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50%
(25.3 percent) and Hispanic (23.7 percent) work-
ers paid by salary report knowing when they 
will need to work one day or less in advance. 
Moreover, an especially high percentage of 
both hourly (42.3 percent) and salaried (45.4 
percent) workers in construction, production, 
and transportation jobs only know their sched-
ules one day or less in advance.
Intersection of the Dimensions of Work Schedules
As reported earlier, the multiyear data indicate 
that only a small minority of workers experi-
ence the combination of limited input into the 
timing of their work and working a nonregular 
(irregular, on- call, rotating, or split shift) sched-
ule. However, the 2016 data indicate that an im-
portant percentage of workers experience both 
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Table 6. Descripitves of Advance Schedule Notice, 2016 GSS
1 Day or Less 2 to 3 Days 4 to 7 Days 1 to 2 Weeks 3 to 4 Weeks Over 4 Weeks Schedule Static
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
All employees 17.0 15.2 10.0 9.0 12.9 6.5* 12.7 9.0 5.3 1.1* 7.7 9.1 34.3 50.0**
Men 28.0 14.5** 6.8 10.2 15.4 7.8* 5.3 9.6^ 6.0 2.2 3.2 10.9* 35.3 44.8
Women 9.1 16.0 12.3 7.7 11.2 5.1^ 18.0 8.5* 4.8 0** 10.9 7.2 33.7 55.5**
Race
White 11.8 14 8.3 9.1 13.1 8.4 16.1 10.6 5.6 1.2* 10.5 10.8 34.7 45.9*
Black 14.9 25.3 11.1 5.3 12.8 0^ 14.4 13.5 2.0 0 6.6 0 38.2 55.9*
Hispanic 29.7 23.7 13.6 9.4 15.5 0^ 4.0 0 6.2 2.3 0 9** 31.0 55.7
Age
26 and younger 10.5 19.4 18.9 15.3 18.5 0.0* 8.2 0.0 6.5 5.7 9.0 0 28.4 59.6
27–35 17.2 9.8 7.7 7.4 19.6 2.3** 7.6 5.5 5.7 0 9.9 7.8 32.4 67.2
36–45 21.3 6.8 7.5 10.0 9.3 6.9 12.6 12.6 3.9 1.8 9.1 8.4 36.4 53.5
46–54 22.5 19.3 17.2 9.7 2.6 5.6 20.1 9.6 5.7 0.0 3.2 9.7 28.8 46.0
55–64 14.7 24.7 2.2 7.1 16.5 13.8 14.1 5.5 1.9 0.0 8.8 15.5 41.8 33.4**
65 and older 12.0 20.9 7.3 4.4 14.3 7.9 14.9 24.7 14.9 4.5 4.7 6.2 31.9 31.4
Work hours
Full time 19.7 13.1^ 6.9 9.4 10.1 6.1* 11.3 10.2 4.9 1.0* 7.7 9.0 39.4 51.2
Part time 8.8 33.8 19.8 6.4 21.3 10.1 17.4 0.0^ 6.8 2.2 7.7 10.5 18.2 37.0
Education
High school or less 20.3 21.7 9.2 10.4 15.3 4.8* 13.4 5.3 3.8 0.7 4.4 15.2** 33.7 41.9
More than high school, less 
than four-year college
11.7 6.3 5.4 3.8 8.2 21.6 9.2 20.0 10.5 0.0 11.0 11.4 44.0 36.8
College degree or more 6.6 12.8 15.1 8.9 6.0 5.3 11.6 9.6 9.0 1.5** 18.8 5.3** 33.0 56.5**
Earnings
Low pay 14.3 25.9 19.7 10.7 20.6 1.8* 13.8 9.4 4.0 0.0 2.2 8.7^ 25.4 43.5^
Higher pay 20.9 13.9 5.1 9.6 8.4 7.3 11.2 11.0 6.1 1.8* 10.2 10.5 38.1 45.8
Occupation
Management, business, office, 
admin support
6.2 14.4 7.4 7.2 10.6 9.0 13.9 3.8* 4.9 1.3 6.2 8.4 50.7 55.9
Professional, related fields 8.1 7.8 7.7 10.3 6.0 6.3 11.4 10.5 8.7 1.8^ 18.0 7.2^ 40.2 56.1
Service, sales, related fields 11.5 16.8 16.5 5.3 21.0 5.3 18.4 22.5 5.0 0.0 7.6 18.9 19.9 31.2
Construction, production, 
transport, natural resources
42.3 45.4 5.5 19.3^ 9.3 0.0 4.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.3 35.3
Union
Non-union 16.1 15.9 10.0 9.3 12.9 7.2* 12.6 9.1 5.5 1.2* 8.2 8.6 34.7 48.7*
Union 25.6 9.0 6.1 6.6 14.0 0.0^ 14.2 8.3 3.9 0.0 3.8 13.9 32.4 62.2
Total (N) 15.6 (82) 9.5 (50) 10.9 (57) 11.2 (59) 4.6 (24) 7.8 (41) 40.4 (212)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Percentages and means (standard deviations). All percentages are weighted. Total sample size is 
525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaried workers.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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Table 6. Descripitves of Advance Schedule Notice, 2016 GSS
1 Day or Less 2 to 3 Days 4 to 7 Days 1 to 2 Weeks 3 to 4 Weeks Over 4 Weeks Schedule Static
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
All employees 17.0 15.2 10.0 9.0 12.9 6.5* 12.7 9.0 5.3 1.1* 7.7 9.1 34.3 50.0**
Men 28.0 14.5** 6.8 10.2 15.4 7.8* 5.3 9.6^ 6.0 2.2 3.2 10.9* 35.3 44.8
Women 9.1 16.0 12.3 7.7 11.2 5.1^ 18.0 8.5* 4.8 0** 10.9 7.2 33.7 55.5**
Race
White 11.8 14 8.3 9.1 13.1 8.4 16.1 10.6 5.6 1.2* 10.5 10.8 34.7 45.9*
Black 14.9 25.3 11.1 5.3 12.8 0^ 14.4 13.5 2.0 0 6.6 0 38.2 55.9*
Hispanic 29.7 23.7 13.6 9.4 15.5 0^ 4.0 0 6.2 2.3 0 9** 31.0 55.7
Age
26 and younger 10.5 19.4 18.9 15.3 18.5 0.0* 8.2 0.0 6.5 5.7 9.0 0 28.4 59.6
27–35 17.2 9.8 7.7 7.4 19.6 2.3** 7.6 5.5 5.7 0 9.9 7.8 32.4 67.2
36–45 21.3 6.8 7.5 10.0 9.3 6.9 12.6 12.6 3.9 1.8 9.1 8.4 36.4 53.5
46–54 22.5 19.3 17.2 9.7 2.6 5.6 20.1 9.6 5.7 0.0 3.2 9.7 28.8 46.0
55–64 14.7 24.7 2.2 7.1 16.5 13.8 14.1 5.5 1.9 0.0 8.8 15.5 41.8 33.4**
65 and older 12.0 20.9 7.3 4.4 14.3 7.9 14.9 24.7 14.9 4.5 4.7 6.2 31.9 31.4
Work hours
Full time 19.7 13.1^ 6.9 9.4 10.1 6.1* 11.3 10.2 4.9 1.0* 7.7 9.0 39.4 51.2
Part time 8.8 33.8 19.8 6.4 21.3 10.1 17.4 0.0^ 6.8 2.2 7.7 10.5 18.2 37.0
Education
High school or less 20.3 21.7 9.2 10.4 15.3 4.8* 13.4 5.3 3.8 0.7 4.4 15.2** 33.7 41.9
More than high school, less 
than four-year college
11.7 6.3 5.4 3.8 8.2 21.6 9.2 20.0 10.5 0.0 11.0 11.4 44.0 36.8
College degree or more 6.6 12.8 15.1 8.9 6.0 5.3 11.6 9.6 9.0 1.5** 18.8 5.3** 33.0 56.5**
Earnings
Low pay 14.3 25.9 19.7 10.7 20.6 1.8* 13.8 9.4 4.0 0.0 2.2 8.7^ 25.4 43.5^
Higher pay 20.9 13.9 5.1 9.6 8.4 7.3 11.2 11.0 6.1 1.8* 10.2 10.5 38.1 45.8
Occupation
Management, business, office, 
admin support
6.2 14.4 7.4 7.2 10.6 9.0 13.9 3.8* 4.9 1.3 6.2 8.4 50.7 55.9
Professional, related fields 8.1 7.8 7.7 10.3 6.0 6.3 11.4 10.5 8.7 1.8^ 18.0 7.2^ 40.2 56.1
Service, sales, related fields 11.5 16.8 16.5 5.3 21.0 5.3 18.4 22.5 5.0 0.0 7.6 18.9 19.9 31.2
Construction, production, 
transport, natural resources
42.3 45.4 5.5 19.3^ 9.3 0.0 4.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.3 35.3
Union
Non-union 16.1 15.9 10.0 9.3 12.9 7.2* 12.6 9.1 5.5 1.2* 8.2 8.6 34.7 48.7*
Union 25.6 9.0 6.1 6.6 14.0 0.0^ 14.2 8.3 3.9 0.0 3.8 13.9 32.4 62.2
Total (N) 15.6 (82) 9.5 (50) 10.9 (57) 11.2 (59) 4.6 (24) 7.8 (41) 40.4 (212)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Percentages and means (standard deviations). All percentages are weighted. Total sample size is 
525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaried workers.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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limited input and either short notice or hour 
volatility. As reported in table 2, 16.2 percent of 
workers overall report little or no input into the 
number of hours they work while also working 
highly fluctuating hours, and more than one- 
fifth report having no input into the timing of 
their work in combination with either a volatile 
work schedule or a week or less notice. Notably, 
more than one- fourth (25.1 percent) of workers 
report the “double whammy” of both a volatile 
work schedule and one week or less of advance 
notice. In all cases, the likelihood of potentially 
problematic combinations is greater among 
hourly workers.
Unpacking further the intersection of very 
short notice and schedule input may help dis-
cern whether unpredictable schedules are em-
ployer driven or due to employee preference. 
Analyses, not reported on the tables, suggest 
the former is the case among a larger propor-
tion of hourly workers than salaried workers. 
For example, among salaried workers reporting 
a day or less of advance notice, only 18.2 percent 
also report they have little or no say in the num-
ber of hours they work, whereas 38.1 percent of 
hourly workers who report a day or less of no-
tice report they have little say in the number of 
weekly hours. Strikingly, among white workers 
who report a day or less of notice, 22.8 percent 
say that they have little or no input into the 
number of hours they work, but among black 
workers reporting a day or less, 69.2 percent say 
they have little or no input into the number of 
weekly hours. These patterns provide further 
evidence that examining the intersection of dif-
ferent dimensions of work schedules may be 
necessary to discern their meaning in the lives 
of workers and families and their contributions 
to inequality, as suggested in prior research 
(Lambert et al. 2019; McCrate 2012, 2017; Presser 
2003).
Do Workers “Age Out” of  
Precarious Work Schedules?
An examination of the descriptive data on 
schedule input and advance notice suggests 
that hourly workers may gain more predictabil-
ity in their schedules as they age, whereas sala-
ried workers may gain more control over sched-
ule timing and the number of hours they work. 
For example, the percentage of workers who 
report a day or less notice increases with age 
among salaried workers but decreases among 
hourly workers. The opposite is true of “my 
schedule never changes;” the proportion of 
hourly workers who choose this response in-
creases with age and the proportion of salaried 
workers decreases. On the other hand, salaried 
workers but not hourly workers, gain control 
over their work hours as they age. By age fifty- 
five, more than half of salaried workers report 
that they can decide starting and finishing 
times within certain limits or entirely (61.4 per-
cent) and more than one- third of salaried work-
ers (35.3 percent) report that they control the 
number of hours they work “within limits.” 
Hour fluctuations also dissipate somewhat 
with age, but less so for hourly workers. As 
shown in table 3, fluctuations in work hours, as 
measured by relative instability, drop over the 
age of fifty- four, except for hourly workers sixty- 
five or older. Even so, the trends by age also in-
dicate that a substantial proportion of workers, 
even those fifty- five or older, do not age out of 
fluctuating work hours.
Fundamental Features of Work  
Schedules and Perceived Insecurity: 
Multiyear GSS Data
To address the second research question, we 
use the multiyear GSS data in regression mod-
els to estimate the extent to which fundamental 
aspects of work schedules can help explain 
workers’ economic insecurity and distrust in 
institutions, providing a foundation for assess-
ing the contribution the more nuanced mea-
sures in the 2016 GSS may make to understand-
ing the relationship between precarious 
scheduling practices and perceived insecurity.4
The findings pertaining to financial insecu-
rity support the contention that, per Pfeffer and 
DeVoe, how workers are paid matters (2012). As 
shown in table 7 (panel A), across all models 
employing the full sample, hourly workers re-
port significantly greater financial insecurity 
than salaried workers, even after controlling for 
4. Table A2, panel A, reports associations between the control variables and financial insecurity, job insecurity, 
and institutional distrust included in analyses of the multiyear data.
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household income and composition. The sheer 
number of hours respondents report working 
in the prior week and whether respondents 
worked an irregular–on- call (or nonregular) 
schedule are not significantly related to finan-
cial insecurity for either hourly or salaried 
workers, suggesting that these basic work- hour 
conditions do not effectively differentiate the 
extent to which workers feel financially vulner-
able overall.
Job insecurity shows a different pattern (ta-
ble 7, panel B). As anticipated, hourly and sala-
ried workers do not significantly differ in their 
overall assessments of job security, but they do 
vary in the aspects of work schedules that in-
form their perceptions of job insecurity. Among 
hourly workers, the more hours they work in 
the preceding week, the less insecure they feel 
in their job (table 7, panel B, models 2 through 
7). Although working more hours may help pro-
tect hourly workers from a sense of job insecu-
rity, it does not save them from the job insecu-
rity that accompanies working an irregular 
schedule, especially when those hours are de-
termined by the employer. An irregular or on- 
call schedule almost doubles the odds (OR = 
1.89) of job insecurity among hourly workers, 
and triples the odds (OR = 3.23) when combined 
with a lack of input into start and end times, 
although caution is needed because only 5.4 
percent of hourly workers report working an 
irregular or on- call schedule (see table 1). Work-
ing an irregular schedule is also positively as-
sociated with distrust in institutions alone (ta-
ble 7, panel C, model 3) and especially when the 
irregularity of hours is determined by employer 
rather than the employee (table 7, panel C, 
model 6), but only among hourly workers. 
Working an irregular schedule or having non-
regular hours does not appear to contribute to 
job insecurity or institutional distrust among 
salaried workers.
In sum, the pattern of relationships between 
these fundamental aspects of work schedules 
and economic and societal insecurity begin to 
flesh out themes we summarize in the litera-
ture review—the economic valuation of time, 
as marked by how workers are paid, seems to 
shape the meaning of work hours; working 
more hours may reduce feelings of job insecu-
rity; and irregular or on- call hours, especially 
when under employer control, may have con-
sequences beyond their economic ramifica-
tions.
Scheduling Practices, Economic Insecurity, 
and Institutional Distrust: 2016 GSS
In regard to the third research question, the 
new items in the 2016 GSS allow us to examine 
in greater detail the qualities of work schedules 
that may place workers at risk of economic in-
security and institutional distrust. All models 
control for the same set of personal character-
istics included in the multiyear analyses.5 In 
these models, however, we control for respon-
dents’ reports of usual work hours rather than 
hours worked last week. As detailed in table 3, 
weekly work hours vary a great deal during a 
one- month period and thus hours worked last 
week could be the exception rather than the 
rule.6 We look at hourly and salaried workers 
separately to provide further insight into how 
the strength of the connection between work 
hours and earnings may shape the relationship 
between different dimensions of work sched-
ules and perceptions of economic and societal 
insecurity.
Work Schedules and Financial Insecurity
The 2016 data provide additional information 
on the scheduling practices that contribute to 
greater financial insecurity among hourly work-
ers, as observed in the multiyear data. Findings 
are consistent with our proposition that 
whether fluctuating hours contribute to or de-
tract from job quality depends on the magni-
tude and direction of the volatility. As shown 
in table 8 (panel A, model 1), the magnitude of 
volatility in weekly work hours is negatively re-
lated to hourly workers’ perceptions of finan-
5. Table A2, panel B, reports associations between control variables and financial insecurity, job insecurity, and 
institutional distrust in the 2016 data.
6. Analyses using “hours last week” rather than “usual hours” do not substantively change the parameter esti-
mates of our key independent variables; the question on usual hours was not available in all of the years in the 
combined data set.
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Table 7. Regressions for Fundamental Characteristics of Work Schedules, Multiyear GSS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Full Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Hourly 0.083* (0.032) 0.073* (0.032) 0.073* (0.032) 0.072* (0.032)
Hours last week –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.001 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.001 (0.002) –0.001 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.002)
Irregular schedule 0.051 (0.042) 0.087 (0.055) –0.014 (0.068)
Nonregular timing 0.021 (0.033) 0.010 (0.042) 0.016 (0.061)
Lack of input into timing 
Irregular with no input
Nonregular with no input
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Hourly 0.053 (0.164) –0.002 (0.162) 0.006 (0.163) –0.020 (0.159)
Hours last week –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008) –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.006) 0.004 (0.008) –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008)
Irregular schedule 0.571* (0.262) 0.639^ (0.356) 0.486 (0.386)
Nonregular timing 0.267 (0.194) 0.342 (0.236) 0.005 (0.354)
Lack of input into timing 
Irregular with no input
Nonregular with no input
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Hourly 0.000 (0.021) 0.005 (0.021) 0.005 (0.021) 0.003 (0.021)
Hours last week 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Irregular schedule 0.097** (0.037) 0.163** (0.046) 0.018 (0.056)
Nonregular timing 0.031 (0.023) 0.040 (0.028) 0.032 (0.043)
Lack of input into timing 
Irregular with no input
Nonregular with no input
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Hourly 0.060^ (0.031) 0.072* (0.032) 0.0170* (0.032)
Hours last week –0.002^ (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.001 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.001)
Irregular schedule
Nonregular timing
Lack of input into timing 0.088** (0.027) 0.053 (0.035) 0.122** (0.040)
Irregular with no input 0.106 (0.077) 0.120 (0.093) 0.017 (0.110)
Nonregular with no input 0.047 (0.049) 0.031 (0.056) 0.077 (0.094)
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Hourly –0.020 (0.159) –0.023 (0.162) –0.034 (0.163)
Hours last week –0.011* (0.005) –0.018** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008) –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.006) 0.004 (0.008) –0.012* (0.005) –0.018** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008)
Irregular schedule
Nonregular timing
Lack of input into timing 0.120 (0.138) 0.434* (0.177) –0.453^ (0.241)
Irregular with no input 1.166** (0.374) 1.174** (0.451) 0.937 (0.817)
Nonregular with no input 0.591** (0.255) 0.669* (0.275) –0.223 (0.693)
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Hourly 0.007 (0.022) 0.003 (0.021) 0.005 (0.021)
Hours last week 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Irregular schedule
Nonregular timing
Lack of input into timing –0.014 (0.017) –0.001 (0.021) –0.042 (0.027)
Irregular with no input 0.135* (0.051) 0.179** (0.061) –0.013 (0.089)
Nonregular with no input 0.011 (0.029) 0.012 (0.034) 0.013 (0.050)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on multiyear General Social Survey data (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: N= Full = 3,564; salaried 2,121; hourly 1,443.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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Table 7. Regressions for Fundamental Characteristics of Work Schedules, Multiyear GSS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Full Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Hourly 0.083* (0.032) 0.073* (0.032) 0.073* (0.032) 0.072* (0.032)
Hours last week –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.001 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.001 (0.002) –0.001 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.002)
Irregular schedule 0.051 (0.042) 0.087 (0.055) –0.014 (0.068)
Nonregular timing 0.021 (0.033) 0.010 (0.042) 0.016 (0.061)
Lack of input into timing 
Irregular with no input
Nonregular with no input
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Hourly 0.053 (0.164) –0.002 (0.162) 0.006 (0.163) –0.020 (0.159)
Hours last week –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008) –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.006) 0.004 (0.008) –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008)
Irregular schedule 0.571* (0.262) 0.639^ (0.356) 0.486 (0.386)
Nonregular timing 0.267 (0.194) 0.342 (0.236) 0.005 (0.354)
Lack of input into timing 
Irregular with no input
Nonregular with no input
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Hourly 0.000 (0.021) 0.005 (0.021) 0.005 (0.021) 0.003 (0.021)
Hours last week 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Irregular schedule 0.097** (0.037) 0.163** (0.046) 0.018 (0.056)
Nonregular timing 0.031 (0.023) 0.040 (0.028) 0.032 (0.043)
Lack of input into timing 
Irregular with no input
Nonregular with no input
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary Full Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Hourly 0.060^ (0.031) 0.072* (0.032) 0.0170* (0.032)
Hours last week –0.002^ (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.001 (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.001)
Irregular schedule
Nonregular timing
Lack of input into timing 0.088** (0.027) 0.053 (0.035) 0.122** (0.040)
Irregular with no input 0.106 (0.077) 0.120 (0.093) 0.017 (0.110)
Nonregular with no input 0.047 (0.049) 0.031 (0.056) 0.077 (0.094)
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Hourly –0.020 (0.159) –0.023 (0.162) –0.034 (0.163)
Hours last week –0.011* (0.005) –0.018** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008) –0.011* (0.005) –0.017** (0.006) 0.004 (0.008) –0.012* (0.005) –0.018** (0.007) 0.005 (0.008)
Irregular schedule
Nonregular timing
Lack of input into timing 0.120 (0.138) 0.434* (0.177) –0.453^ (0.241)
Irregular with no input 1.166** (0.374) 1.174** (0.451) 0.937 (0.817)
Nonregular with no input 0.591** (0.255) 0.669* (0.275) –0.223 (0.693)
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Hourly 0.007 (0.022) 0.003 (0.021) 0.005 (0.021)
Hours last week 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Irregular schedule
Nonregular timing
Lack of input into timing –0.014 (0.017) –0.001 (0.021) –0.042 (0.027)
Irregular with no input 0.135* (0.051) 0.179** (0.061) –0.013 (0.089)
Nonregular with no input 0.011 (0.029) 0.012 (0.034) 0.013 (0.050)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on multiyear General Social Survey data (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: N= Full = 3,564; salaried 2,121; hourly 1,443.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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cial insecurity. Further analyses of the direction 
of volatility (available from authors) indicates 
that surges above forty- five hours a week sig-
nificantly lowers hourly workers’ perceptions 
of financial insecurity; among the 81.6 percent 
of hourly workers incurring at least some fluc-
tuations in hours, the larger the proportion of 
fluctuations above forty- five hours, the lower 
their financial insecurity (b = –0.311, p < .05). 
Among hourly workers, then, surging up into 
overtime seems to play a protective role when 
it comes to financial insecurity.
The opposite picture emerges for workers 
paid a salary. Although the number of hours 
worked was not significantly related to salaried 
workers’ financial insecurity in the multiyear 
data, usual hours is positively associated with 
financial insecurity among salaried workers in 
all of the models specified with the 2016 GSS 
data. The more hours salaried workers report 
that they usually work, the greater their finan-
cial insecurity. This finding is consistent with 
research indicating that some salaried workers 
may work long hours out of fear that not doing 
so will lower their chances for advancement 
(Perlow 2012).
In addition to the sheer number of work 
hours, lack of control over the timing (but not 
the number) of work hours is positively associ-
ated with financial insecurity among salaried 
workers, a relationship also found in the mul-
tiyear data. The findings also suggest that less 
than a week of advance notice plays a substan-
tial role in heightening perceptions of financial 
Table 8. Regressions for New Dimensions of Work Schedules, 2016 GSS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Usual hours –0.003 (0.004) 0.007* (0.003) –0.000 (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) –0.000 (0.004) 0.007* (0.003) –0.001 (0.004) 0.006* (0.003) –0.001 (0.004) 0.008** (0.003)
Magnitude of fluctuations (relative 
instability)
–0.189** (0.046) 0.038 (0.097)
Week or less notice –0.005 (0.095) 0.190^ (0.094)
Little or no input into number of hours 0.069 (0.076) –0.014 (0.068)
Little or no input into timing of hours 0.130 (0.095) 0.126^ (0.072)
Nonregular timing –0.045 (0.099) –0.132 (0.108)
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Usual hours –0.006 (0.016) 0.004 (0.018) –0.006 (0.016) 0.007 (0.016) –0.011 (0.016) 0.011 (0.017) –0.008 (0.017) 0.009 (0.017) –0.001 (0.016) 0.009 (0.016)
Magnitude of fluctuations (relative 
instability)
0.368 (0.235) –0.300 (0.523)
Week or less notice 0.706* (0.319) –0.232 (0.458)
Little or no input into number of hours –0.348 (0.342) 0.368 (0.454)
Little or no input into timing of hours –0.345 (0.334) 0.753^ (0.423)
Nonregular timing 1.349** (0.333) –1.702** (0.576)
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Usual hours 0.003^ (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004)
Magnitude of fluctuations (relative 
instability)
0.047 (0.038) 0.190** (0.048)
Week or less notice 0.013 (0.043) 0.009 (0.051)
Little or no input into number of hours –0.042 (0.037) –0.091 (0.067)
Little or no input into timing of hours –0.022 (0.042) –0.070 (0.073)
Nonregular timing 0.017 (0.060) –0.067 (0.075)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Standard errors (SE). Total sample size is 525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaried workers.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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insecurity among salaried workers, by itself 
(table 8, panel A, model 2) and in combination 
with volatile work hours (table 9, panel A, 
model 2), lack of input into start and end times 
(table 9, panel A, model 4), and lack of input 
into number of hours (table 9, panel A, model 
5). Thus, although much research has focused 
on the importance of advance notice for hourly 
workers, these results suggest that short ad-
vance notice can undermine the financial secu-
rity of workers paid a salary.
Work Schedules and Job Insecurity
In the multiyear data, the number of hours 
hourly workers report working in the last week 
is negatively associated with job insecurity 
across all models estimated. In the 2016 data, 
usual weekly hours is not significantly associ-
ated with job insecurity for either hourly or sal-
aried workers (table 8, panel B), and the non-
significance holds when hours worked last 
week, rather than usual hours, is entered in 
models (not in table). Although the sheer num-
ber of hours does not help explain job insecu-
rity in this smaller 2016 data set, other aspects 
of work schedules do. As in the multiyear data, 
working a nonregular schedule (that is, a sched-
ule other than a “regular day, afternoon, eve-
ning schedule”) is positively associated with 
hourly worker job insecurity (table 8, panel B, 
model 5). Short advance notice also heightens 
job insecurity among hourly workers, either 
alone (table 8, panel B, model 2) or in combina-
tion with work- hour volatility (table 9, panel B, 
Table 8. Regressions for New Dimensions of Work Schedules, 2016 GSS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Usual hours –0.003 (0.004) 0.007* (0.003) –0.000 (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) –0.000 (0.004) 0.007* (0.003) –0.001 (0.004) 0.006* (0.003) –0.001 (0.004) 0.008** (0.003)
Magnitude of fluctuations (relative 
instability)
–0.189** (0.046) 0.038 (0.097)
Week or less notice –0.005 (0.095) 0.190^ (0.094)
Little or no input into number of hours 0.069 (0.076) –0.014 (0.068)
Little or no input into timing of hours 0.130 (0.095) 0.126^ (0.072)
Nonregular timing –0.045 (0.099) –0.132 (0.108)
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Usual hours –0.006 (0.016) 0.004 (0.018) –0.006 (0.016) 0.007 (0.016) –0.011 (0.016) 0.011 (0.017) –0.008 (0.017) 0.009 (0.017) –0.001 (0.016) 0.009 (0.016)
Magnitude of fluctuations (relative 
instability)
0.368 (0.235) –0.300 (0.523)
Week or less notice 0.706* (0.319) –0.232 (0.458)
Little or no input into number of hours –0.348 (0.342) 0.368 (0.454)
Little or no input into timing of hours –0.345 (0.334) 0.753^ (0.423)
Nonregular timing 1.349** (0.333) –1.702** (0.576)
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Usual hours 0.003^ (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004)
Magnitude of fluctuations (relative 
instability)
0.047 (0.038) 0.190** (0.048)
Week or less notice 0.013 (0.043) 0.009 (0.051)
Little or no input into number of hours –0.042 (0.037) –0.091 (0.067)
Little or no input into timing of hours –0.022 (0.042) –0.070 (0.073)
Nonregular timing 0.017 (0.060) –0.067 (0.075)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Standard errors (SE). Total sample size is 525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaried workers.
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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model 2). Together, these findings suggest that 
nonregular timing and lack of advance notice 
contribute to hourly workers’ sense of job inse-
curity, especially when they work highly fluctu-
ating hours.
Again, a different picture surfaces among 
salaried workers. Rather than contributing to 
job insecurity, working a nonregular schedule 
is negatively related to job insecurity among 
salaried workers (table 8, panel B, model 5). 
This relationship may reflect the value employ-
ers place on being willing and able to work out-
side standard hours, as discussed in the intro-
duction. Were this the case, however, we would 
also expect to see a significant negative rela-
tionship between the magnitude of work- hour 
fluctuations and job insecurity, and we do not; 
although the relationship between relative in-
stability and job insecurity is negative, it is not 
statistically significant (table 8, panel B, model 
1). The only other dimension of work schedules 
significantly associated with job insecurity 
among salaried workers is that lack of input 
into the timing (not the number) is positively 
associated with job insecurity, though only at 
the p < .1 level. These results provide further 
evidence that the nature of relationships be-
tween work scheduling practices and perceived 
Table 9. Regressions for Combinations of Scheduling Practices, 2016 GSS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Volatility plus little input into number 0.115 (0.095) 0.098 (0.125)
Volatility plus short notice –0.038 (0.106) 0.269* (0.111)
Volatility plus little input into timing 0.124 (0.084) 0.131 (0.119)
Short notice plus little input into 
timing
0.181^ (0.098) 0.264^ (0.137)
Short notice plus little input into 
number
0.022 (0.093) 0.342^ (0.172)
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Volatility plus little input into  
number 
–0.256 (0.468) 0.558 (0.641)
Volatility plus short notice 0.859** (0.302) 0.320 (0.534)
Volatility plus little input into timing –0.136 (0.335) 0.718 (0.680)
Short notice plus little input into 
timing
0.371 (0.396) –1.755 (1.180)
Short notice plus little input into 
number
–0.011 (0.465) –0.480 (0.900)
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Volatility plus little input into  
number 
0.072 (0.068) –0.108 (0.084)
Volatility plus short notice 0.058 (0.051) 0.092 (0.066)
Volatility plus little input into timing 0.062 (0.056) –0.077 (0.101)
Short notice plus little input into 
timing
0.016 (0.050) –0.150 (0.148)
Short notice plus little input into 
number
0.065 (0.069) –0.165 (0.178)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Standard errors (SE). Total sample size is 525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaries workers. 
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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insecurity are likely different for workers paid 
by hour and salary. Although working a non-
regular schedule may impede a sense of job se-
curity among hourly workers, it seems to play 
a protective role among salaried workers.
Work Schedules and Distrust of Institutions
Analyses of the multiyear survey data suggest 
that working irregular or on- call shifts, espe-
cially when they are employer controlled, is as-
sociated with distrust in institutions among 
hourly workers only. Supplemental analyses of 
the 2016 data help fill in this picture. Although 
the overall magnitude of fluctuations in weekly 
hours is not statistically significant in explain-
ing hourly workers’ distrust in institutions (ta-
ble 8, panel C, model 1), those with highly vola-
tile hours (relative instability is at least 0.25) 
report greater distrust in institutions than 
those with less volatility (b = 0.106, p < .05, not 
in table). The direction of the fluctuation mat-
ters, however. Workers who report shortfalls in 
weekly hours (at least 25 percent less than their 
usual hours) report significantly greater insti-
tutional distrust than workers who report 
smaller shortfalls in weekly hours (available 
from authors).
Although the multiyear data reveal no sig-
Table 9. Regressions for Combinations of Scheduling Practices, 2016 GSS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary Hourly Salary
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Panel A. Financial insecurity (OLS)
Volatility plus little input into number 0.115 (0.095) 0.098 (0.125)
Volatility plus short notice –0.038 (0.106) 0.269* (0.111)
Volatility plus little input into timing 0.124 (0.084) 0.131 (0.119)
Short notice plus little input into 
timing
0.181^ (0.098) 0.264^ (0.137)
Short notice plus little input into 
number
0.022 (0.093) 0.342^ (0.172)
Panel B. Job insecurity (logits)
Volatility plus little input into  
number 
–0.256 (0.468) 0.558 (0.641)
Volatility plus short notice 0.859** (0.302) 0.320 (0.534)
Volatility plus little input into timing –0.136 (0.335) 0.718 (0.680)
Short notice plus little input into 
timing
0.371 (0.396) –1.755 (1.180)
Short notice plus little input into 
number
–0.011 (0.465) –0.480 (0.900)
Panel C. Distrust in institutions (OLS)
Volatility plus little input into  
number 
0.072 (0.068) –0.108 (0.084)
Volatility plus short notice 0.058 (0.051) 0.092 (0.066)
Volatility plus little input into timing 0.062 (0.056) –0.077 (0.101)
Short notice plus little input into 
timing
0.016 (0.050) –0.150 (0.148)
Short notice plus little input into 
number
0.065 (0.069) –0.165 (0.178)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018).
Note: Standard errors (SE). Total sample size is 525,334 for hourly workers and 191 for salaries workers. 
^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01
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nificant associations between work scheduling 
qualities and distrust in institutions among 
salaried workers, the 2016 GSS indicates that 
the more hours fluctuate, the greater salaried 
workers’ distrust of institutions. But, like their 
hourly counterparts, it is salaried workers who 
experience shortfalls in hours (at least 25 per-
cent less than their usual) who express the most 
distrust in societal institutions (available from 
the authors).
disCussion
The sources of uncertainty are expanding in the 
U.S. labor market. This article considers em-
ployer scheduling practices as one determinant 
of uncertainty that is undermining the quality 
of jobs and quality of life in the United States. 
Recent research traces the relationship be-
tween fluctuations in weekly work hours to vol-
atility in workers’ earnings and household in-
comes and in turn, to financial insecurity and 
hardship. In this article, we look at these rela-
tionships from the workers’ perspective by ex-
amining the ramifications of fluctuating work 
hours, alone and in combination with other 
scheduling practices, for perceived insecurity, 
both economic and societal. Our findings sug-
gest that different dimensions of work sched-
ules may serve to undermine, or bolster, hourly 
and salaried workers’ perceptions of financial 
and job security and their trust in major insti-
tutions. Findings also suggest that workers who 
are black, young, and without a college degree 
are at highest risk of experiencing problematic 
combinations of scheduling practices.
The questions commonly used in national 
surveys to capture the nature of working time 
may underestimate the prevalence of problem-
atic scheduling practices in today’s U.S. labor 
market because they do not offer insight into 
several key dimensions—such as the magni-
tude and direction of work- hour fluctuations, 
length of advance notice, and amount of input 
into the number of weekly hours—that may 
be especially prevalent in today’s workplaces. 
In particular, the new questions on the 2016 
General Social Survey suggest that working 
fluctuating hours is significantly more com-
mon than captured by commonly used survey 
questions. For example, at most, one- fifth of 
workers would be identified as working fluctu-
ating hours if based on the common question 
of schedule type (for example, irregular, on- call, 
or split or rotating shift), whereas more than 
three- fourths of workers gave different re-
sponses when reporting the greatest versus few-
est number of hours they worked a week in the 
past month. For most, these fluctuations were 
not inconsequential, averaging more than a full 
day of work and approximately one- third of 
their usual weekly hours—all within just a one- 
month period.
The new 2016 GSS questions enabled us to 
update and unpack the nature of work sched-
ules in the U.S. labor market further by also ex-
amining the length of advance schedule notice 
and input into both timing and hours. Like fluc-
tuating hours, these additional aspects of work 
schedules have the potential to undermine job 
quality. We find that two- fifths of hourly and 
one- third of salaried workers report one week 
or less advance schedule notice, almost two- 
thirds of hourly and one- third of salaried work-
ers report that the starting and finishing times 
of their work shifts are decided by their em-
ployer, and almost one- half of hourly and one- 
third of salaried workers report that employers 
entirely decide the number of hours they work. 
Limited advance notice and input into work 
hours are especially commonplace among 
black and Hispanic workers in hourly jobs; in 
addition, although a substantial proportion of 
women report having precarious work sched-
ules, the data suggest that men are at even 
greater risk. The data provide evidence that 
some, but certainly not all, workers age out of 
precarious work schedules, with hourly workers 
gaining more predictability as they age and sal-
aried workers gaining more control.
Our analyses reveal several themes worthy 
of future research. One key theme concerns the 
importance of taking into account how workers 
are paid when investigating the implications of 
work hours for economic insecurity. Findings 
lend support to Pfeffer and DeVoe’s observation 
that the structure of compensation can prime 
the economic valuation of time (2012). In our 
multiyear survey analyses, we find that workers 
paid by the hour report greater financial inse-
curity than those paid a salary, after adjusting 
for covariates. The differing relationships we 
observe between number of weekly hours and 
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perceptions of economic insecurity among 
hourly versus salaried workers further high-
light how employer practices that structure the 
tie between hours and earnings may alter work-
ers’ experiences of their work hours. Among 
hourly workers, the greater the number of usual 
weekly hours, the lower their job insecurity 
(multiyear GSS) and notably, work- hour surges 
above forty- five hours a week seem to further 
protect hourly workers from experiencing job 
insecurity (2016 GSS, not in table). This makes 
sense, given that earnings are a function of 
hours worked, and, if employers are following 
the law, hourly workers receive a premium 
when weekly hours exceed forty. Salaried work-
ers do not receive such a premium, and in the 
2016 GSS the number of hours salaried workers 
worked last week was positively related to finan-
cial insecurity across several models. Together, 
these findings suggest that working long hours 
may reduce economic insecurity among hourly 
workers, but may foster, or be a response to, 
economic insecurity among salaried workers. 
These analyses are associational, not causal; 
notably, salaried workers may be working lon-
ger hours because they feel insecure, rather 
than vice versa.
Another theme that emerges from our find-
ings is that fluctuating hours are not always a 
marker of a poor- quality job. The ramifications 
of work- hour fluctuations depend on their mag-
nitude and direction. In the 2016 GSS, the 
greater the volatility in weekly hours, the lower 
hourly workers’ financial insecurity—especially 
when the majority of hour fluctuations were 
due to surges above forty- five hours a week. 
Thus, questions in surveys that ask about hour 
variations as a yes or no job characteristic or as 
a particular schedule type provide limited in-
sight into the conditions under which fluctuat-
ing hours matter for workers’ lives. Future re-
search is needed to examine how the magnitude 
and direction of fluctuating hours are related 
to nonfinancial aspects of life. We find that 
working fluctuating hours is positively associ-
ated with workers’ distrust of societal institu-
tions, among both hourly (multiyear GSS) and 
salaried (2016 GSS) workers. Further analyses 
revealed that the direction of the fluctuations 
mattered, with distrust being highest among 
workers who reported a substantial shortfall in 
weekly hours. The magnitude and direction of 
work- hour fluctuations may matter for family 
life as well. For example, although surges in 
work hours may help protect workers from fi-
nancial insecurity, they may complicate care-
giving and create stress (Henly and Lambert 
2014).
The findings of this study also highlight the 
usefulness of considering scheduling practices 
in combination with one another. In the mul-
tiyear data, the combination of working an ir-
regular or on- call schedule plus little input into 
the timing of work increased the odds of job 
insecurity among hourly and salaried workers. 
In the 2016 data, although work- hour volatility 
is not significantly related to financial insecu-
rity among salaried workers when examined 
alone, the combination of hour volatility plus 
either short advance notice or lack of input into 
schedule timing are both positively associated 
with these workers’ perceptions of financial in-
security. These findings add to evidence that 
fluctuations in work hours can be experienced 
as flexibility or as instability, depending on 
whether they are employee versus employer 
driven (Fugiel and Lambert 2019; Henly, Shae-
fer, and Waxman 2006).
The results suggest that advance notice is a 
salient aspect of job quality not only among 
hourly workers, but among salaried workers as 
well. The budding literature on advance notice 
has focused on the implications of schedule un-
predictability mostly among low- paid hourly 
workers (Henly and Lambert 2014; Schneider 
and Harknett 2016). Daniel Clawson and Naomi 
Gerstel’s recent examination of predictability 
in health- care settings, however, reminds us 
that it is not that unpredictability is unimport-
ant to higher- status workers but that they are 
better equipped to avoid it (2014). The results 
of this study confirm that the length of advance 
schedule notice is a marker of job quality in 
hourly jobs. Among hourly workers, less than 
a week’s notice is positively related to financial 
insecurity, when accompanied by a lack of in-
put into the timing of hours, and job insecurity, 
when accompanied by volatile hours. Our find-
ings also suggest that length of advance notice 
is a marker of the quality of salaried positions 
as well. Among salaried workers, a week or less 
of notice is positively associated with financial 
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insecurity when examined alone and in combi-
nation with work- hour volatility and lack of in-
put into both the number and timing of work 
hours.
The scheduling practices that undermine 
job quality can have consequences for commu-
nities and society. In this article, we explore the 
possibility that work schedules may be unset-
tling beyond their economic ramifications by 
undermining confidence in societal institu-
tions. Our findings suggest that experiencing 
shortfalls in weekly hours may help cement the 
growing distrust in key societal institutions ob-
served in the United States over several de-
cades. This finding raises the possibility that 
growing rates of involuntary part- time employ-
ment may exacerbate American’s distrust in in-
stitutions, and perhaps in one another. Such 
possibilities seem worthy of further investiga-
tion.
We remind readers that the observed asso-
ciations, and the lack thereof, come from ex-
ploratory analyses. Although in some analyses 
we are able to capitalize on the larger sample 
afforded by pooling multiple years of the GSS, 
these years included only a handful of ques-
tions on work schedules. The 2016 GSS pro-
vided data on a richer set of work scheduling 
practices, however the one- year sample limited 
statistical power. Moreover, the very nature of 
our dependent variables set the bar high in 
terms of identifying the ramifications of sched-
uling practices. The questions making up our 
index of financial insecurity capture workers’ 
assessment of overall economic well- being and 
standard of living, rather than the more tangi-
ble aspects of financial hardship that research 
suggests can occur when workers’ hours vary 
at the behest of their employer and with little 
time to adjust expenses or budgets (Morduch 
and Schneider 2017). Examining the relation-
ship between everyday scheduling practices 
and what seems a fairly distal outcome—con-
fidence in societal institutions—is similarly 
ambitious.
Even with these conceptually ambitious 
measures, the results provide evidence that 
scheduling practices that introduce instability 
and unpredictability into workers’ lives—vola-
tile work hours, little input into the timing 
and number of hours, and short advance no-
tice—undermine the quality of many American 
jobs. From a research standpoint, the findings 
attest to the merits of examining how different 
dimensions of work schedules, both funda-
mental and more nuanced aspects, operate in 
tandem to affect workers’ assessments of their 
lives and livelihoods. The widespread preva-
lence of work- hour volatility, short advance no-
tice, and limited input into the number and 
timing of hours—and the concentration of 
these among marginalized subgroups—sug-
gest the merits of further study of the con-
ditions under which, and for whom, these 
scheduling practices heighten insecurity and 
distrust.
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